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ABSTRACT
It has been argued by advocates of land value taxation that the centrepiece
of tax reform should be land taxation, because of the efficiency, equity,
simplicity and ethical advantages of taxation of the unearned increment in
land values. This paper critiques these arguments. It is shown, by historical
reference to the fate of land value taxation in the Australian states, to the ACT
public leasehold system, and to the Commonwealth capital gains tax, that
such tax reform will never succeed precisely because of its advantages,
which adversely impinge on the interests of politically powerful landowners.
1
LAND VALUE TAXATION
Introduction
Land value taxation is an attractive revenue raising tool. However, its rationality is its
defect. The paramount rule of taxation is `plucking the goose so as to obtain the largest
amount of feathers with the least amount of hissing'.1 Taxing unearned increments in land
values threatens Australia's most powerful interest groups, offending this primary rule.
History demonstrates Australia's governments lack the qualities needed to sustain land
value taxation against attack by powerful vested interests.
`Tax Reform: a Rational Solution'2 proposes  a `community charge' of 100 per cent
on land rental values to reduce income taxes. The authors say this is `logically and
morally unassailable'. The only barrier is cultural - `private appropriation of land values
has been taken for granted and institutionalised'. As `recouping the whole of the annual
rental value would reduce the price [of land] to zero', they propose introducing the
charge gradually. With compensation for `unconscionable' equity effects, the system
would be `transparent, simple and cost effective, equitable, efficient, and incapable of
avoidance'. It would also `provide free market economics with a universally applicable
moral base', by  distinguishing between land, and commodities and services which are
the fruits of human labour.
However, this perfectly ethical and rational revenue instrument contains the seeds
of its own destruction. Another rule of taxation is `the only good tax is an old tax'.  A
`good' tax - which raises revenue - is the one left after the most powerful groups in
society have had their say. In our imperfect world, democratic political institutions are
flawed and mobile capital exercises significant economic power. The inevitable, if
unethical and irrational consequence is that tax burdens are shifted onto the fruits of
labour.  Taxes on unearned increments in land values never become old and 'good',
because powerful landholder opposition nobbles them, if not at conception, then soon
after birth.
Are Governments Moral And Rational?
`Tax Reform' presumes government revenue raising policy is motivated by ethics, to
achieve rational, stated objectives.
Although taxation policy is a `values-added' issue,  prevailing political ideologies
discount social or ethical concerns and Governments defer to values generated and
revealed in `The Market' by those with economic influence.
_____________________
1 Jean Baptiste Colbert, 1619-83.
2 Day, P., R. Else-Mitchell, et al. (1996). Tax reform: a rational solution.
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Public debate is in objective terms such as achieving efficient, equitable, simple,
easy to enforce and comply with, and transparent taxes.  However, governments do not
make policy by rational consideration of all relevant issues; economic policy is `the
science of muddling through'.3 In the historical `March of Folly' - `the persistent pursuit
by governments of policies contrary to their own interests'4- neither logic nor morality
have predominated.
Governments' stated objectives are rarely their real ones. Their real tax objectives
are identified by Colbert - minimising hissing, while plucking maximum revenue from
the goose.
On traditional public finance criteria, appropriating unearned increments in land
values is an exemplary source of revenue. The merits of land value taxation have been
known for a long time and are widely accepted.  Over a century ago, reformers argued
compellingly for public appropriation of the unearned increment in land.5  Modern town
planning has strengthened the original rationale -
`Recent international discussions have served to underline the widespread conviction
that these surplus values should accrue to the public, since they are produced mainly
by public or community efforts and are unearned by the private holders'.6
Yet, governments have largely ignored its revenue potential. Indeed, successive
governments have eroded or abolished existing levies of this kind at every opportunity.
What Really Drives Tax Policy?
Tax policy is about raising revenue. As governments seek revenue, the privileged and
powerful try shifting the tax burden by threatening to take their capital, and sometimes
their labour, elsewhere.
A `global economy' and capital mobility challenges governments' ability to tax
according to ability to pay, indeed to tax capital7 at all. The tax burden is shifting from
capital, which is more, to labour, which is much less mobile.8 Meanwhile, governments'
increasing revenue needs  foreshadow `a fiscal crisis of the state'.9
_____________________
3 Lindblom, C. (1959). “The science of muddling through.” Public administration 19(2 Spring): 79-88.
4 Tuchman, B. (1984). The March of Folly. Great Britain, Michael Joseph Ltd.
5 Brennan, F. (1971). Canberra In Crisis. Canberra, Dalton.
6 Dunkerley, H. B., Ed. (1983). Urban Land Policy, Issues and Opportunities.  Oxford, Oxford
University Press: 23.'
7 Some skilled labour is also highly mobile.
8 Graetz, M. J. (1985). “Reform of Australian business taxation.” Australian Tax Forum 2(4).
9 O'Connor, J. (1973). The Fiscal Crisis Of The State. New York, St Martin's Press.
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Immobile factors - labour and land - must ultimately bear the burden of all taxation
as globalisation bypasses national revenue systems.10 For two decades, Australian
governments have seen a GST as a panacea for their taxing problems. Worshipping
mythical advantages of taxing labour income when spent, rather than taxing it when
earned, they have left taxes on land, that other immobile factor, to languish or wither
away.
Do Governments Have Integrity to Sustain Ethical and Rational Revenue Policies?
Changing economic conditions make levies on land rental values vulnerable to erosion by
vested interests groups.
Public appropriation of development rights, the major element in the value of land,
is politically difficult. It also requires very large, high-level administrative skills beyond
the current capability of many governments. Since urban land is so valuable, and
particular locations command semimonopolistic prices, public efforts to capture full land
rental values are compromised by corruption and favouritism.11  Indeed, early Australian
land policy was,
`a dispiriting story of the lack of foresight, faulty legislation, poor administration,
political corruption, dishonest practices, moral cowardice and human greed'.12
The influence and capabilities of democratic political institutions such as those in
Australia are crumbling under the force of vested corporate interests and the increasing
integration of the world economy. Modern governments cannot cope effectively with the
problems our society confronts because;13
• Governments are unresponsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups, yet responsive
to demands by strong private interests which they helped entrench;
• Political parties are powerless to resist pluralist and corporatist influences;
• Distinctive public interests are not articulated or are applied by ineffective or
irresponsible bureaucracies beholden to powerful interests.
One can only conclude that even if the rational and ethical community charge were
introduced, governments do not have the integrity and sophistication to sustain it.
_____________________
10 Courchene, T. (1993). Globalisation, Institutional Evolution And The Australian Federation.
Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University.
11 Doeble, W. (1983). Concepts of urban land tenure. Urban Land Policy, Issues And Opportunities  .
Dunkerley. ed. op cit: 63-107.
12 Brennan, F. (1971), op cit.
13 Self, P. (1985). Political Theories Of Modern Government. UK, George Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. See
also Hutton, W. (1995). The State We're In. Great Britain, Jonathon Cape Ltd; Martin, H. (1997). The
Global Trap; Saul, J. R. (1997). The Unconscious Civilisation. Victoria, Penguin.
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Previous Australian Experience
Weakened by its assumptions in conception, the `perfect tax ' could also be flawed in
execution. The `community charge' invites political attack and erosion because in practice
it may generate inequity, economic damage, and other problems. Its revenue yield might
be minimal.
The unearned increment in land values comprises several elements. The most
important are: `development gains' due to permitted changes in land use or shifts in
locational advantage; public spending on infrastructure provision, associated with
`betterment' taxes or `special assessments'; and `land gains', arising from the general
progress of an economy.
Each element must be dealt with differently to fully capture unearned increments.
A levy on annual rental value differs from levying changes in value. A fixed annual
charge on land rental value would not fully capture development gains or value
increments due to public infrastructure spending.
Land prices also rise for reasons other than unearned increments in land value. As
prices reflect capitalised values of anticipated income flows, values vary with high
interest rates or rising prices, as well as fluctuations in profitability of land use.
Hence, the proposed community value charge might overtax or undertax true land
rental values.
A `comprehensive', and `ethical' approach may not generate revenue from taxing
development gain. Without affecting underlying demand or supply of land, planning
decisions can not affect overall land values.14 Avoiding `confiscation' by compensating
planning `wipeouts' means little revenue, as losses at one location will offset gains in
value elsewhere. Equitable compensation for recent land purchasers and the `asset-rich,
income-poor' would open costly loopholes.
Careless administration of land levies also produces inequities and damaging
economic effects.15 Valuation remains an art not a science; practices vary. Problems arise
in assessing unimproved values without an active local market in raw land.
These practical flaws turn `hissing' by vested interests at a `perfect' tax into
plausible complaints of `confiscation' and `theft'.
It is not feasible in practice to tax imputed rental income at 100 per cent.
Historically, governments have been unable to charge more than 30-40 per cent tax rates
on land or  mineral resource rents, even where the public has legal title. The ethical
_____________________
14 Prest, A. R. (1983), op cit.
15 Mathews, R. L. (1992). Land taxation in Australia revisited, the historical development of Australian
land taxes. Real Property And Land As A Tax Base For Development. Taoyuan, Land Reform
Training Institute.
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argument of `community rights' over land will not silence the voice of historical fact —
private ownership and appropriation of value increments. Gradual introduction is no
remedy. A 10-year transition to levying 100 per cent of land rents is akin to announcing
all land value will be confiscated by the end of the period. If the threat was credible,
current market prices of land would quickly fall, to little more than the discounted value
of the revenue payments for the ten year period.16
Converting freehold land into long leases with reversionary rights to the state,17 or
capturing future development valuesi18 may achieve similar ends. However, as Prest
points out,
`the fact that the first approach was outlined by Marshall in England in the 1880s
and the second by J S Mill in the 1840s without any action being taken should be a
warning to enthusiasts about there being a very stony furrow to plough'.19
Experience with Australia's land taxes, ACT public leasehold, development rights
charges, and taxation of Crown minerals proves the point. So too does capital gains
taxation.
Land Taxes
Australia levies unearned land value increments through land taxes and rates on
unimproved values.20 Legislators' primary motive for such levies was revenue during
fiscal crisis. These land levies captured only a fraction of unearned value increments
because of landholders influence in the legislatures.21
The spectre of capital flight frightened legislators. 'Capital', they heard, was a
beneficent genius. `But she is shy, and can easily take wings and fly from land to lan'.22
_____________________
16 See Walters, A. (1983). The Value of Land. Urban Land Policy, Issues And Opportunities  . Dunkerley.
ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 40-62.
17 (Else-Mitchell) Royal Commission of Inquiry into Rating, Valuation and Local Government Finance
(1967). Report. Sydney, NSW Government Printer.
18 (Else-Mitchell), Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenures. (1974). Interim Report. Canberra., AGPS;
and (1976). Final Report. Canberra., AGPS.
19 Prest, A. R. (1983), op cit: 10-11.
20 For the history of these land taxes see for example, Garland, J. M. (1934). Economic Aspects Of Land
Taxation In Australia. Melbourne, University Press, Melbourne; Else-Mitchell, R. (1974). Legacies
Of The Nineteenth Century Land Reformers From Melville To George. John Murtagh Macrossan
Lecture,    University of Queensland Press; Mathews, R. L. (1992). op cit; Groenewegen, P. D. (1979).
"Progress And Poverty"  In Historical Perspective. Commemoration of the centenary of publication
of `Progress and Poverty" by Henry George, Australian School of Social Sciences.
21 Smith, J. P. (1993). Taxing Popularity. Canberra, Federalism Research Centre, ANU.
22 Catherine Spence, quoted in Goodwin, C. D. W. (1966). Economic Enquiry In Australia. Durham
NC., Duke University Press, p125.
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Few distinguished investing in speculative asset holding from investing in productive
capacity.
Because of the political clout of landowners, farmers and pastoralists received
generous exemptions. Although combined federal and state land taxes were heavy at
first,23 even the highest rates were far below 100 per cent of rental value. And though the
1910 federal land tax levied crown leases, organised landholders and pastoral interests
soon overturned it. Reimposition in 1914 produced such sustained hue and cry from
pastoral lessees that their legislative representatives overturned it a decade later — also
trying to make the change retrospective! Governments' slow reaction to double taxation
and low farm prices in the late 1920s meant some land taxes were paid out of capital.
This fuelled taxpayer discontent. By 1933-34, rates were half wartime levels.24
In 1952 the Menzies government abolished the federal land tax, so states could
replace lost income tax revenues. The states did no such thing. By the 1950s states' land
taxes were already substantially eroded. Reflecting the political power of the farm lobby,
and in response to political pressures from homeowners, land used for primary
production had generally been exempted, as had land used for the principal place of
residence.25
This occurred because inflation and misuse as a `progressive' land tax damaged
political viability of the tax and weakened its rationale as a tax on unearned increments.
Changing economic conditions made it increasingly unlikely that such taxes would fall
only on pure 'land rents'. Land values were rising not just from population pressures, but
because farm prices and profits rose. Variations in land fertility, and the effect of
changing farming technology on land productivity meant careless valuation could
penalise improvements. Changes in inflation or interest rates also altered the rate of
return for those 'investing' in landownership. Higher interest rates made the land taxes
into taxes on capital.
As more of Australia's wealth took the form of assets other than land, strong
pressures emerged to exempt rural and residential land from `discriminatory wealth
taxes'. Exemption of various landowner categories during the severe inflation of the
1970s made it inequitable. Inflation pushed more taxpayers into higher tax rate
categories, causing politically embarrassing cases of hardship. Intense criticism by urban
landowners forced changes in the basis of rating as urban land prices accelerated in the
1980s.26 Substantially a tax on urban land, land taxes became highly volatile. Boosting
revenues meant lifting already high rates on a small, influential group of taxpayers.
_____________________
23 Mathews, R. L. (1992), op cit. 
24 Ibid: 5
25 Ibid: 16, 7.
26 Ibid: 18.
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Archaic administration and the variety of valuation procedures produced inequities and
anomalies, arbitrary jumps in land valuations, and tax assessments unmatched by taxable
capacity.27  The result:
`No political party now seems anxious to allow the land tax to operate as a means of
taking from the landowner any part of the value of land as an unearned increment or
for that tax to produce the effect of compelling owners of large or valuable holdings
to dispose of or subdivide them'.28
The largest state tax loopholes are now found in land taxes, which have only ever
accounted for around 5 per cent of state taxes. In NSW, concessions are five times greater
than revenue collected.29
As land-owners are one of the main identifiable political groupings on which state
politicians depend on to get elected, there is little scope to increase revenue from taxes on
land. Land and property interests make important contributions to political party finances.
Despite the merits of reforming land taxes to make them more comprehensive,30 state
governments prefer higher taxes on payrolls and business franchises. As George Bernard
Shaw pointed out,
`A government which robs Peter to pay Paul can always count on the support of
Paul'.
Public Leasehold
Under the `Tax Reform' proposal, land tenure arrangements would be unchanged.
However, what matters is not land tenure but how economic equity in the land is
allocated between public and private `stakeholders'.31 A charge equal to full market land
rental amounts to public capture of all existing private financial equity in land value. If
the public cannot even collect the full value of unearned land value increments in the
ACT, where it has full legal ownership, then capturing it on land held under private title
is a pipe dream.
Canberra's public leasehold system is rooted in the arguments made in the same era
as land value taxation. There was unparalleled unanimity of public opinion at federation
_____________________
27 Ibid.
28 Else-Mitchell). (1974): 19.
29 Walsh, C. (1990). State Taxation and Vertical Financial Imbalance. Issues in State Taxation. C.
Walsh: 67.
30 Albon, R. (1990). The Impact of State Taxation: The Case of Housing. Issues in State Taxation. C.
Walsh:43-52.
31 (Else-Mitchell). (1974), and (1976), op cit.
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that land in the national capital should be publicly owned.32 A key objective was to avoid
unproductive land speculation and unrequited public expense or inequitable wealth
accumulation, by public capture of increments in national capital land values.
Long delays in adjusting rents had already eroded the public's equity in Canberra
land values by the late 1960s. Irregular revaluations produced arbitrary rises in land rents
during 1960 inflation. Rents on residential leases were abolished as a political gesture
from 1 January 1971.
Public capture of land value increments was still feasible on non-residential leases,
or when residential lease values rose due to planning changes. However, these were only
half-heartedly pursued. Pressure from local land and property interests, combined with
weak and inept administration, allowed private appropriation of most remaining public
equity.
• lessees were never levied the full increment in value on lease purpose
changes;
• commercial and rural lessees were permitted to increase their economic
equity by `paying out' leases.
• the ACT government bestowed `a gift to sitting owners of commercial and
industrial leases'33 by waiving lease renewal fees.
There was, it is said, `no ethical or economic reasons why such a gift of a national
asset should be made'. Yet local land and property owners have persuaded the federal
government to glue the national land grab into place by authorising perpetual leasehold,
drawing spurious arguments for equity, `freehold rights', and investment incentive.34
Despite unwavering community support for the public leasehold system, non
residential lessees have exercised political power to change the rules in their favour.35
They were aided and abetted by government and the bureaucracy:
`Administrators, and on occasions politicians, have been markedly impervious to
criticism and persisted in pursuing practices which have jeopardised the integrity of
the leasehold system'.36
Lack of political integrity, bureaucratic incompetence and indifference, combined
with powerful local land and property interests and threats of capital flight defeated
_____________________
32 Brennan, F. (1971). op cit
33 Stein, P., P. Troy, et al. (1995). Report Into The Administration Of ACT Leasehold. Canberra, ACT
government: 218
34 ACT (Planning and Land Management) Amendment Bill 1997.
35 Neutze M 1995, `Is there a Future for Leasehold Tenure in Urban Areas', URP Newsletter no 23, June,
ANU.
36 Stein, P., P. Troy, et al. (1995), op cit: 47.
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effective capture of land values in Australia's national capital, even under public land
ownership.37
Betterment Taxes
An alternative approach to capturing unearned land value increments is to levy
development gains from public planning changes. NSW introduced such a charge in 1970
following recommendations by a Royal Commission of Inquiry.38 However, the scheme
was short-lived, being abolished within a few years.  Those who stood to profit from
rezoning decisions convinced decisionmakers the measure was pushing up land prices.39
Unless backed by the threat of compulsory public acquisition, landowners have
shown they will undermine such a policy by raising prices. However, as Prest comments
`that is a policy which most governments are more willing to talk about than
implement'.40
Similar issues arose from recommendations by the Land Tenures Inquiry in 1976.41
But pleas for ethics and rationality fell on deaf ears. Threats the tax would raise land
prices won the day.
Resource Taxes
Taxes on land value are conceptually similar to mineral `resource rent taxes'.42 Like
land value taxes, properly designed levies on these mineral `rents' can produce substantial
revenues without undermining returns to genuine enterprise.43 They too can conserve
scarce resources and prevent premature exploitation and dissipation of value.44
_____________________
37 Brennan, F. (1971). op cit; Neutze, M. (1987). “Planning and Land Tenure in Canberra after 60
Years.” Town Planning Review 58: 147-64; Smith, J. P. (1997), op cit; Stein, P., P. Troy, et al. (1995)
op cit.
38 Else-Mitchell 1967 op cit.
39 Neutze, M. (1977). State and Local Property Taxes. State and Local Taxation. Mathews: 167; Prest,
A. R. (1983), op cit. If developers or landowners expected the charge would be removed, they had an
incentive to delay development.
40 Ibid: 15
41 Else-Mitchell 1976, op cit.
42 Reece, B. F. (1986). “Could land betterment be taxed using resource rent tax concepts?” Australian
Economic Papers 5(3): 39-52.
43 See Smith, B. and A. Ulph (1979). Economic Principles And Taxation Of The Mining Industry.
Taxation of the mining industry, ANU Canberra, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies;
Swan, P. (1984), ibid. 
44 Swan, P. (1984). “Resources rent tax: the issues.” Australian Economic Papers 3(3): 1-10
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Australian governments own all minerals. However, the political power wielded by
mining capital, and the ever present threat of flight has meant the community's resource
rents on minerals have not been captured for public profit.
In a rare burst of reformist zeal, the Commonwealth government introduced a 40%
Resources Rent Tax in 1984 within its limited jurisdiction over offshore resources.
However, backed by the mining industry, state governments refused to replace
inequitable and economically wasteful existing mining taxes and royalties45 with the
Resource Rental Tax.46
Capital Gains Taxes
The case for taxing `land gains' is `part and parcel of the case for taxing capital gains'.47
However, for nearly a century Australian parliaments proved incapable of taxing capital
gains at all.
Most capital gains remain untaxed. The present levy falls only on realised gains,
and has major loopholes through rollover into other assets. All assets acquired before
1985  and owner-occupied homes are exempt. Rural pressure resulted in assets being
deemed unrealised on death, emasculating the tax as a partial levy on land value gains.
As a US property millionairess Leona Helmsley says, `only the little people pay taxes'.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
`There are grounds for believing that many of those responsible for public policy
view the taxation system merely as a symbol, which can be used to defuse complex
and controversial issues of social and economic policy so long as it gives the
appearance of contributing to stated goals. Whether or not this is so, it is time that
we began to evaluate the tax system by reference to the effects which it actually
achieves and not the effects which governments say they intend to achieve.48
Raising public revenue by taxing unearned increments in land values has produced
disappointing results. Weak or inept administration combined with practical flaws in `the
perfect tax', leaves the way open for plausible protest at public capture of unearned
increments. Government inability to distinguish genuine concerns from the squeals for
_____________________
45 Livingstone, D. F. (1979). State mineral royalties in the Federal system. B. Smith and A. Ulph. op cit:
62-86.
46 Lloyd, P. J. (1984). “Summary.” Australian Economic Papers 3(3): 32-37.
47 Prest, A. R. (1983), op cit: 12
48 Mathews, R. L. 1983. The Case for Indirect Taxation, Reprint Series No. 54, CRFFR, ANU: 24.
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abolition, undermines land levies' political viability. Tax policies are not rational if
judged by stated objectives.  They are rational if viewed as rhetoric, hiding the reality that
the public are the `gooses' who should be hissing.
Modern governments have proved unable to defend `the public interest' against
coalitions of private vested interests profiting from community-owned land value
increments. It is not surprising, as Seligman commented a century ago, that,
`the constitutional history of England is to a large extent a history of the struggle of
the people to gain control of the Treasury' 49
                                                
_____________________
49 Seligman, E. R. A. (1900). Essays in Taxation. London., McMillan & Co: 76.
